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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2893 
___________ 
 
                     SECRETARY OF LABOR, 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
 
      Petitioner 
 
    v. 
 
CONOCOPHILLIPS BAYWAY REFINERY,   
  
      Respondent 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission 
(OSHRC Docket No. 07-1045) 
 
__________ 
 
Argued 
July 12, 2011 
___________ 
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Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
(Opinion Filed: August 16, 2011) 
 
 
Gary K. Stearman (Argued) 
U.S. Department of Labor 
200 Constitution Ave., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20210 
 Counsel for Petitioner  
 
Dennis J. Morikawa (Argued) 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 
1701 Market St. 
Phila, PA 19103 
 Counsel for Respondent 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In this appeal, although ConocoPhillips Bayway 
Refinery is the real party in interest, we are asked to decide 
between different interpretations of agency regulations—the 
one announced by the Secretary of Labor, the other by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.  Both 
entities are part and parcel of the Department of Labor.  In 
this appeal, because two factions within the same government 
agency disagree with each other over the application of a 
standard, we are thrust into resolving what is essentially an 
3 
 
internal dispute.  We do so here, and hold that the Secretary's 
interpretation comports with the standard we established in 
Secretary of Labor v. Trinity Industries, 504 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 
2007).
1
   
 
I. 
 
 The Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) petitioned this 
Court to challenge the determination of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”) that 
nine asbestos violations by ConocoPhillips Bayway Refinery 
(“Conoco”) were “not serious” rather than “serious” under 29 
U.S.C. § 666.  The Secretary originally cited Conoco for nine 
“serious” violations of the asbestos in construction standard, 
29 C.F.R. § 1926.1100, under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (“Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.  The 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) affirmed all of the 
violations and upheld the classification of the violations as 
“serious.”  The Commission thereafter reduced the 
classification of the nine violations to “other-than-serious,” in 
part because the Secretary failed to present case-specific 
evidence of possible employee exposure to asbestos.   
                                              
1
 “[The Occupational Safety and Health Administration] separates enforcement 
and rulemaking powers from adjudicatory functions.  The Secretary is charged 
with the responsibility for setting and enforcing workplace safety standards.  
[She] is empowered to issue authoritative interpretations of the statute and „has 
the sole authority to determine whether to prosecute a violation of the Act.‟”  
Reich v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 998 F.2d 134, 137 
(3d Cir. 1993) (citing Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 474 
U.S. 3, 5 (1985)).  “The Commission, on the other hand, is assigned to carry out 
adjudicatory duties . . . In performing its tasks, the Commission reviews the 
Secretary‟s interpretation only for reasonableness and consistency with statutory 
and regulatory language.”  Id.  “Stated simplistically, the Secretary is entrusted 
with the enforcement and interpretation of law and the Commission with making 
findings of fact.”  Id.  
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 We conclude that the Commission misapplied this 
Court‟s precedent in Secretary of Labor v. Trinity Industries, 
504 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2007).  We will therefore vacate the 
Order of the Commission, and remand to the Commission 
with the direction that the citations be affirmed as “serious” 
and that the penalty for the violations be reconsidered. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
 Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary shall promulgate 
occupational safety and health standards.  29 U.S.C. § 655.
2
  
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”), an agency within the Department of Labor, helps 
the Secretary promulgate these standards.  OSHA regulates 
asbestos exposure at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.1101 (construction 
standard) and 1910.1001 (industry standard), and has 
determined that asbestos is a harmful substance.  E.g. 
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite, 
Anthophyllite, and Actinolite, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,647-48, 
22,698 (June 20, 1986) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910); 
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,967, 
40,979 (Aug. 10, 1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910). 
 
B. 
                                              
2
  Because the various asbestos terms which we employ throughout this opinion 
are known by their acronyms, we furnish this glossary: 
ACM = Asbestos Containing Material 
PACM = Presumed Asbestos Containing Material 
TSI = Thermal System Insulation  
PEL = Permissible Exposure Limit 
f/cc = fiber per cubic centimeter of air 
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 The construction standard (“Standard”), the regulation 
at issue in this case, prescribes certain protective requirements 
based on the measurable concentration of asbestos fibers to 
which employees are or may be exposed, and contains a 
second set of specific requirements that apply regardless of 
the level of exposure.   
 
 The Standard sets a permissible exposure limit (PEL) 
of 0.1 fiber per cubic centimeter of air (f/cc), and imposes 
certain assessment and monitoring requirements to ensure that 
no employee is exposed to an airborne concentration of 
asbestos in excess of this limit.
3
  29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101(c).  
This PEL represents the lowest exposure level that can be 
reliably measured.  59 Fed. Reg. 40,967.  The Standard 
recognizes a significant risk even under a PEL of 0.1, and in 
order to reduce that risk to the extent practicable, the Standard 
has taken an approach of adding certain protective provisions 
based on the kind of operations being regulated.  59 Fed. Reg. 
40,968.  See also id. 40,967 (acknowledging that the 0.1 f/cc 
level “leaves a remaining significant risk”).  Additionally, 
measured levels of exposure “often fail to define risk,” and 
with regard to removal work (the type of work at issue in this 
case), “highly variable amounts of asbestos are generated.” 
Id. 40,968.  Therefore, the Standard requires such employees 
to be protected in order to assure each asbestos worker is 
exposed to the lowest feasible level.  Id.  The mandated work 
practices are important because they “assure that each 
asbestos worker is exposed to the lowest feasible level.”  Id. 
40,969.  “The operations for which mandatory work practices 
                                              
3
  Of note, the PEL is not equivalent to the percentage of asbestos that a 
particular material contains.  For example, a mastic may be 20% asbestos, but 
the PEL may be under 0.1.   
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are required would otherwise result in employee exposure 
that is significant.”  Id. 
 
 The Standard classifies asbestos work activities into 
four classes, of which only Class I and Class II are relevant in 
this appeal.   
 
 Class I asbestos work refers to activities involving the 
removal of TSI (thermal system insulation), surfacing ACM 
(asbestos containing material) and PACM (presumed asbestos 
containing material).  29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101(b). 
 
 Class II asbestos work consists of the removal of ACM 
which is neither TSI nor surfacing material—for example, 
asbestos-containing wallboard, floor tile and sheeting and 
construction mastics.   Id.  
 
 The work at issue in this case falls into Class II.  
Protective requirements for Class II work include:  the 
establishment of a regulated area (§ 1926.1101(e)(1)); the use 
of respirators (§ 1926.1101(h)); in the absence of a negative 
exposure assessment, the use of protective clothing (§ 
1926.1101(i)(1)); and training of employees (§ 
1926.1101(k)(9)(iv)(C)). 
 
 All employers with workplaces covered by the 
Standard must conduct an initial exposure assessment before 
or at the beginning of an operation to ascertain expected 
exposures of asbestos.  29 C.F.R. § 1926(f)(2).  For Class I 
asbestos work, “until the employer conducts exposure 
monitoring and documents that employees on that job will not 
be exposed in excess of the PELs,” the employer shall 
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presume that employees are exposed in excess of the limit.  
Id. § 1926(f)(2)(ii).   
 
 Violations of OSHA standards are characterized as 
“willful,” “repeated,” “serious,” or “not serious” (referred to 
by the Commission as “other-than-serious”).  See 29 U.S.C. § 
666.  A violation is “serious” if: 
 
 [T]here is a substantial probability that death or 
serious physical harm could result from a 
condition which exists, or from one or more 
practices, means, methods, operations, or 
processes which have been adopted or are in 
use, in such place of employment unless the 
employer did not, and could not with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the 
presence of the violation. 
 
Id. § 666(k).  “Serious” and “not serious” violations are both 
subject to civil penalties of up to $7,000.  A penalty is 
mandatory for “serious” violations.  Id. § 666(b),(c). 
 
C. 
 
 Conoco operates a refinery in Linden, New Jersey.  In 
September 2006, Conoco determined that an underground 
pipeline installed in the early 1950s was leaking gasoline and 
needed to be partially replaced.  The gas line, 14” in diameter, 
was housed inside a 20” protective pipe (“the sleeve”), which 
was coated with a tar-like substance (“the mastic”).  Conoco 
did not initially test the mastic to determine whether it 
contained asbestos.  Conoco also failed to perform an initial 
exposure assessment before removing a portion of the sleeve 
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and cutting into the mastic.  Three Conoco mechanics worked 
with the pipe without taking all of the precautions mandated 
by § 1926.1101.  One Conoco mechanic used a hammer and 
chisel for about thirty minutes to chip an approximately 5” 
band of mastic from around the circumference of the sleeve.  
A second mechanic then cut through the sleeve where the 
mastic had been removed with a torch for another thirty 
minutes.  A third Conoco mechanic held the sleeve in a sling 
while it was torched.  These activities were performed 
without using wet methods to control exposures and without 
establishing a regulated area.  The mechanics did not use or 
wear specialized equipment or clothing.   
 
 On September 18, 2006, Conoco began an 
investigation into potential employee exposures resulting 
from the work performed on the underground pipe.  Conoco 
established an investigation team consisting of two union 
representatives and two Conoco management employees.  
The team decided to conduct a mock test on an intact portion 
of the pipe sleeve to determine whether exposure to airborne 
asbestos fibers could have occurred.  The test attempted to 
replicate the work that the employees working on the sleeve 
had conducted.  The investigation report stated that the mock 
testing results showed no detectible levels of airborne 
asbestos in the breathing zone samples.  (J.A. 218-23.)  The 
Secretary disputed the validity of this testing before the ALJ, 
but the ALJ determined that the mock testing was not invalid.  
(J.A. 33-34.)  However, the ALJ also determined that there 
“is no reason to conclude that no asbestos was released during 
the cited work and that there was no exposure to asbestos 
fibers.”  (J.A. 35.)  Rather, the ALJ found it “more likely than 
not that asbestos fibers were released during the cited work 
and that exposure to asbestos occurred.”  (Id.)  The ALJ did 
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determine, based in part on the testing and the low levels of 
fibers detected, that the likelihood of injury was low.  (Id.) 
 
 After OSHA conducted an inspection of the refinery, 
the Secretary, on March 8, 2007, cited Conoco for the 
following violations: 
 Failing to determine the presence, location and 
quantity of ACM and to notify employees of this 
information prior to beginning work, pursuant to § 
1926.1101(k)(2)(i) and (ii).   
 Failing to conduct an initial exposure assessment 
before cutting into the mastic, pursuant to § 
1926.1101(f)(2)(i).   
 Failing to use engineering controls and work practices 
in the form of wet methods, pursuant to § 
1926.1101(g)(1)(ii).   
 Failing to establish a regulated area, pursuant to § 
1926.1101(e)(1).   
 Failing to provide the proper respiratory protection 
equipment, pursuant to § 1926.1101(h)(3)(iii)(A). 
 Failing to require the use of protective clothing, 
pursuant to § 1926.1101(i)(1).  
 Failing to use warning signs, pursuant to § 
1926.1101(k)(7)(i).   
 Failing to train employees, pursuant to § 
1926.1101(k)(9)(iv)(A).   
 Improperly disposing of waste material, pursuant to § 
1926.1101(l)(2).   
(J.A.
4
 246-54.)   
 
                                              
4
  J.A. refers to Joint Appendix. 
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 The Secretary classified all the violations as “serious” 
and proposed a penalty of $2,500 for each. 
 
D. 
 
 The ALJ affirmed all of the violations, and upheld the 
classification of the violations as “serious.”  She found that 
the work involved was Class II work, and further found that 
the Secretary met her burden of proving that the 20” 
protective pipe sleeve and surrounding mastic  contained 
more than 1%  asbestos, and found that Conoco‟s own testing 
established the presence of asbestos levels far higher than 1%, 
for example at 20% and 25%.  (J.A. 20-21, 23.)   
 
 The ALJ additionally found that Conoco had 
“constructive knowledge” of the violative conditions, and 
made the following factual findings: (1) the refinery‟s 
Management Procedure recognized that many areas in the 
refinery contain asbestos, and devotes 17 pages to asbestos 
hazards; (2) Conoco was aware that underground pipes often 
contain asbestos, and the refinery‟s 2005 and 2006 fact sheets 
stated that asbestos could still be found in the refinery; (3) 
Conoco Bayway‟s asbestos training stated that asbestos was 
widely used between 1940 and 1975; and (4) “the subject 
sleeve was known to have been installed in the 1950‟s.”  (J.A. 
27-28.)  She noted additionally that the preamble to the 
asbestos standard indicates that asbestos is used as a filler for 
tar-based surface coatings, which are used as protective 
coatings for underground pipelines.  (J.A. 28, citing 59 Fed. 
Reg. 40,964, 41,028.)   
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 Finally, the ALJ reduced the proposed penalty to 
$1,875 for each violation, in part because Conoco‟s mock 
testing revealed a low likelihood of injury.  (J.A. 32-35.)   
E. 
 
 On review, the Commission reduced the classification 
of the violations to “other-than-serious,” and the total penalty 
from $16,875 to $3,150.  (J.A. 4.)   
 
 The Commission noted that it was “undisputed that the 
tar-like coating around the pipe‟s sleeve contained between 2 
and 25 percent asbestos,” but asserted that the Secretary 
“must show that the work performed on the particular 
material involved in this case . . . could have generated, and 
exposed Conoco employees to, a harmful amount of 
asbestos.”  (J.A. 4-5.)  The Commission faulted the Secretary 
for failing to present any case-specific evidence, and for 
relying solely “on how the asbestos in construction standard 
and its regulatory history address Class II work.”  (J.A. 5.)  
The Commission concluded that there was a possibility in this 
case that the work performed did not have the potential to 
generate and expose Conoco employees to a harmful amount 
of asbestos, and that therefore the Secretary had not 
established that Conoco‟s violations were “serious.”  (J.A. 6.) 
 
 The Secretary timely petitioned this Court for review.
5
   
 
III. 
 
 Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), this Court may set aside the legal conclusions of an 
                                              
5
  The Commission had jurisdiction over the enforcement proceeding pursuant to 
29 U.S.C. § 659(c).  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 660(b). 
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agency body if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(a)(2); Trinity, 504 F.3d at 400.  The Court “must defer 
to an agency‟s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute.”  Trinity, 504 F.3d at 400 (citing Reich v. D.M. Sabia 
Co., 90 F.3d 854, 856 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Issues of pure law, such as whether the 
agency properly applied a legal standard set out by this Court, 
receive plenary review.  See Broome v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 
870 F.2d 95, 99 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
 “In those instances in which the Secretary of Labor‟s 
interpretation differs from the interpretation of the 
[Commission], the Court must defer to the Secretary‟s 
reasonable interpretation.”  Trinity, 504 F.3d at 400.  “[T]he 
Secretary is entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation 
of law.”  Reich, 998 F.2d at 137. 
 
IV. 
 
 The Secretary argues that under the Trinity standard, 
the violations in this case are “serious.”  She maintains that 
she was not required to proffer case-specific evidence to 
demonstrate the seriousness of the violations here, as the 
Commission held, largely because the regulations support a 
presumption that Class II work exposes employees to 
significant amounts of asbestos.  
 
A. 
 
 Although Trinity involved Class I work, it guides our 
analysis here.  In Trinity, the company had work done on a 
furnace that required removing material classified as PACM.  
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Trinity believed that any asbestos present had been removed 
and that new insulation would be asbestos-free, and thus did 
not conduct tests to determine if asbestos was present.  The 
ALJ upheld two violations under § 1926.1101(k), but 
reclassified the violations as “not serious.”  504 F.3d at 400. 
 
 The Secretary claimed on appeal that this was error 
and that the violations should have been classified “serious.”  
504 F.3d at 399-400.  We affirmed the Secretary‟s 
classification.   Id. at 401. 
 
 In Trinity, we set a standard that we apply to determine 
whether many asbestos violations are “serious.”  See 504 F.3d 
at 401.  Initially, we explained that “[i]t is well-settled that, 
pursuant to § 666(k) „when the violation of a regulation 
makes the occurrence of an accident with a substantial 
probability of death or serious physical harm possible, the 
employer has committed a serious violation of the 
regulation.‟”  Id. (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 
607 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original)).   
We held that the ultimate question was whether, “as a result 
of the failure to test and notify, it was possible that an 
accident could occur in which it was substantially probable 
that death or serious physical harm would result.”  Id. 
(emphases added).  As such, demonstrating actual exposure to 
asbestos was unnecessary.  Id.;  see also Walmart Stores, Inc. 
v. Sec’y of Labor, 406 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(holding that actual conditions at work site are beside the 
point because the issue was whether employees could have 
been seriously injured).   
 
 Conoco and the Commission attempt to distinguish 
Trinity by focusing on Trinity‟s statement that where asbestos 
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is “presumed to be present,” a failure to test is 
“unquestionably serious.”  Id.  Potential for exposure, which 
is the focus under the standard, is not dependent upon 
whether the material is ACM or PACM—both can and do 
lead to exposures above the PEL or to exposures below the 
PEL that are still harmful.     
 
 The Commission distinguished Trinity based on the 
differences between Class I work, at issue in Trinity, and 
Class II work, at issue in this case.  (J.A. 6.)  Yet, Trinity 
placed no emphasis on the type of work involved.  Further, 
while Class I work is sometimes presumed to result in a 
concentration over the limit—i.e., definite exposure to 
asbestos—Class II work can still lead to asbestos exposure 
even if the concentration is under the permissible limit.  See 
59 Fed. Reg. 40,968-69, 40,978, 40,982.  Thus the 
Commission acted contrary to Trinity and thus to our declared 
standard in relying on a distinction between Class I and Class 
II work. 
 
 Trinity‟s standard only requires that there could be 
exposure to asbestos that is substantially probable to lead to 
serious harm.  Applying this standard, Conoco‟s violations 
were “serious.” 
 
B. 
 
 The Commission held, and Conoco argues, that the 
Secretary must put forth case-specific evidence showing that 
the employees could have been exposed to harmful asbestos 
and thus that the violations were serious.  The Commission‟s 
determination is contrary both to the standard in Trinity and 
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to the asbestos construction standard, and therefore 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.   
 
 The Commission held that to demonstrate that the 
violations in this case were serious, “the Secretary must show 
that the work performed on the particular material involved in 
this case . . . could have generated and exposed Conoco 
employees to a harmful amount of asbestos.”  (J.A. 5.)  This 
holding ignores the Standard‟s presumption that violations of 
Class II asbestos requirements expose employees to 
substantial amounts of asbestos.  See 59 Fed. Reg. 40,968-69.  
The violations in this case largely involved requirements for 
work practices and engineering controls that are applicable to 
Class II asbestos work without regard to whether exposures 
exceed the PEL.  Under the regulations, the Standard 
indicates that Class II work generates “significant” employee 
exposure to asbestos.  See id.  (noting that the “operations for 
which mandatory work practices are required would 
otherwise result in employee exposure that is significant” and 
that concentrations below the 0.1 f/cc are harmful;);  see also 
59 Fed. Reg. 40,978, 40,982 (observing that reducing 
exposure to 0.1 f/cc does not eliminate significant risk since 
“a still significant risk remains below the PEL”). 
 
The Commission reasoned that the regulations did not 
establish how far below the PEL a risk extends, and that Class 
II work is not presumed to generate any particular PEL.  (J.A. 
6.)  The Commission thus concluded that there is a 
“possibility” that the work in this case “may not have had the 
potential to . . . expose” employees to a harmful amount of 
asbestos, and that therefore the Secretary had not met her 
burden.  (Id.)   
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Thus, the Commission, by its own holding, admits that 
there is a possibility that the work may have actually exposed 
employees to a harmful level of asbestos, which is all that this 
Court‟s standard requires.  The Commission misapplied the 
Trinity standard in seemingly requiring the Secretary to 
negate the possibility that employees may not have been 
exposed to harmful asbestos.  Rather, the Secretary must 
simply demonstrate the possibility of such exposure.   
 
 We therefore conclude that demonstrating the 
possibility of harmful exposure to asbestos does not require 
case-specific evidence under this Court‟s standard, where the 
Secretary demonstrates that (1) employees engaged in a 
particular type of asbestos work, (2) the work at issue is 
presumed to generate significant employee exposure to 
asbestos under the regulations, (3) the employer had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the violative conditions, and (4) 
regulations were violated. 
 
C. 
 
 Finally, we address Conoco‟s argument that under the 
Secretary‟s proposed standard, almost any violation of a 
regulation where harmful asbestos is present would be a 
“serious” violation.  We acknowledge that under the Trinity 
standard, in combination with the asbestos construction 
Standard and its accompanying regulations, many violations 
of asbestos regulations relating to Class II asbestos will be 
presumptively “serious.”  But no bright-line rule has been 
established. 
 
 First, it is not the case that the Secretary demonstrates 
a violation of any asbestos regulation and ipso facto the 
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violation is classified as “serious.”  Class II asbestos work is 
limited to removal of materials that contain more than 1% 
asbestos.  The Secretary pointed to regulations which 
established a presumption that Class II work generates 
significant employee exposure.  This presumption, which may 
not exist for all classes of work, aided the Secretary in 
meeting her burden of showing that exposure to harmful 
asbestos was possible.  In a different case, the Secretary will 
again be required to show that such a presumption exists, or 
demonstrate in some other way that exposure could occur.   
 
 Second, the Secretary indicates that certain violations, 
such as deviations from requirements relating to 
recordkeeping and housekeeping, may not be classified as 
“serious.”   
 
 Third, the Secretary must always show that the 
employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
violative conditions.  See Sec’y of Labor v. Astra Pharm. 
Prods., Inc., 9 BNA OSHC 2126, *4 (Jul. 30. 1981) (aff’d in 
part and remanded in part, Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. 
OSHA, 681 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1982)) (“In order to prove a 
violation of section 5(a)(2) of the [Occupational Safety and 
Health] Act, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2), the Secretary must show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the cited standard 
applies, (2) there was a failure to comply with the cited 
standard, (3) employees had access to the violative condition, 
and (4) the cited employer either knew or could have known 
of the condition with the exercise of reasonable diligence.”) 
(emphasis added).   
 
 Such requirements place limits on the types of work 
and on the employers that can be held accountable for an 
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asbestos violation.  In this case, the ALJ found that Conoco 
had “constructive knowledge” of the violative conditions—
that the sleeve coating contained asbestos—and made 
findings based on evidence which demonstrated Conoco‟s 
constructive knowledge.  (J.A. 27-28.)   
 
 Fourth, although we hold that the Secretary is not 
required to proffer case-specific evidence of potential 
exposure to satisfy this Court‟s standard, we point out that the 
employer is always permitted to rebut by evidence which 
demonstrates that there was no possibility of exposure.  For 
example, an employer could show that the asbestos in this 
case was protected in a way that it could never have been 
released, and thus there was zero chance of exposure.  Such 
evidence could serve the purpose of rebutting the 
presumption in the regulations.  Essentially, where the 
Secretary has shown violations of regulations involving Class 
II work and the presence of asbestos, it will shift the burden 
to the employer to show that the violations were not 
“serious.” 
 
V. 
 
 We conclude that under Trinity, the violations in this 
case were “serious,” and that the Secretary is not required to 
proffer case-specific evidence to meet Trinity‟s standard.  We 
therefore vacate the Order of the Commission, and remand to 
the Commission with the direction that it affirm the citations 
as “serious” and reconsider the penalty for the violations in 
light of this opinion. 
 
